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TAXATION
CnARLrs H. RANDALL, JR.*
A surprisingly large percentage of federal tax cases deal with the
relative priority of federal tax liens, and the lawyer whose practice
concerns property or creditor law would be well advised to note the
major features of this lien law.1 Such a case is United States v.
Scovil,2 involving a general federal tax lien, in which the Supreme
Court of the United States unanimously reversed the Supreme Court
of South Carolina. The facts were chronologically as follows. Be-
tween March 19, 1951 and February 28, 1952, the Collector of In-
ternal Revenue had received in his office the proper assessment lists
indicating that Roy Bass Motor Company was delinquent in federal
payroll taxes. Roy Bass Motor was the tenant of Scovil, and became
delinquent in payment of rent for February, March and April, 1952,
in the amount of $750. On April 7, 1952, the landlord filed in the
Court of Common Pleas of Greenville County a distress for rent.
The following day, April 8, 1952, a receiver was appointed for the
tenant company as an insolvent, and the receiver sold the corporate
assets and realized therefrom a fund which was claimed by the
United States and the landlord. On April 10, 1952, notice of the
federal tax liens was filed in the proper office for recording thereof
in Greenville County.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina, 3 by Mr. Justice Taylor,
held that the rent claim had a priority, since the landlord's lien was
perfected as of the time of the distress for rent, while the Collector's
lien was not perfect until the date of recording of the tax lien. In so
holding, the Court relied on Section 31, U.S.C.A. § 191, and Section
26 U.S.C.A. §§ 3670-3672. 4 Mr. Justice Minton, for the Supreme
0
Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. On the general problems, see Paul A. Anderson, Federal Tax Liens-
Their Nature and Priority, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 241 (1953). On real property
problems, see L. Hart Wright, Title Examinations in Michiqan as Affected By
the General Federal Tax Lien, 51 MIcH. L. Rev. 183 (1952), and Title Ex-
amination As Affected By the Federal Gift and Estate Tax Liens, 51 MicH.
L. REv. 325 (1953).
2 ..........., 99 L. Ed. (Advance p. 197), 75 S. Ct. 244 (1955), reversing
United States v. Scovil, 224 S.C. 233, 78 S.E. 2d 277 (1953).
3. 224 S.C. 233, 78 S.E. 2d 277 (1953).
4. REv. STAT. § 3466 (1946), 31 U.S.C.A. § 191 (1946):
"Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever
the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors or administra-
tors, is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due to
the United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority hereby established
shall extend as well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property
1
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Court of the United States, held that even if perfected, the lien was
not of the type that would prevail over a tax lien, and that the land-
lord's lien was not perfected in the federal sense.5
Federal tax lien law is harsh law- the lien is a secret lien which
attaches as soon as the assessment list, indicating that the taxpayer
has neglected or refused to pay his tax after demand, is received
by the Collector (the 1954 Internal Revenue Code makes the federal
tax lien arise when the assessment is made). The lien thus attaches
to realty before any public record of the assessment is made, and to
personalty before any record is made and before possession is taken.
To mitigate the severity of the law as originally written, the Con-
gress in 19136 amended the law to add the provisions contained in
Section 26 U.S.C.A. § 3672 (now Section 6323 of the Internal
Revenue Code). This provides that the federal lien is not valid as
against any "mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser or judgment creditor"
to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in which the
estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are attached
by process of law, as to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed."
INT. REv. CODE § 3670, 26 U.S.C.A. 3670 (1946), INT. Rtv. CODE § 6321
(1954). PROPERTY SUBJECT TO LIEN.
"If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same
after demand, the amount (including any interest, penalty, additional amount,
or addition to such tax, together with any costs that may accrue in addition
thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and
rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person."
INT. REv. CODE § 3671, 26 U.S.C. 3671 (1946), INT. Rv. CODE § 6322 (1954).
PERIOD OF LIEN.
"Unless another date is specifically fixed by law, the lien shall arise at the
time the assessment list was received by the collector and shall continue until
the liability for such amount is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason of
lapse of time." (Under the 1954 Code, the lien arises at the time the assess-
ment is made).
INT. REv. CODE § 3672, 26 U.S.C.A. 3672 (1946). [Now contained with exten-
sive changes in the language, in INT. REV. CODE § 6323 (1954)].
VALIDITY AGAINST MORTGAGEES, PLIEDGEES, PURCHASERS AND JUDGMENT CRED-
ITORS.
"(a) Invalidity of Lien Without Notice.- Such lien shall not be valid as
against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice
thereof has been filed by the collector-
(1) Under state or territorial laws.-In the office in which the filing of
such notice is authorized by the law of the State or Territory in which the
property subject to the lien is situated, whenever the State or Territory has
by law authorized the filing of such notice in an office within the State or Terri-
tory; . .. ."
COnE OF LAWS OF SOUTE CAROLINA, 1952 § 65-2722. Place of filing liens and
discharges thereof.
"Notices of liens for taxes payable to the United States of America and
certificates discharging such liens shall be filed in the office of the register of
mesne conveyances (or clerk of court in those counties in which the office of
register of mesne conveyances has been abolished) of the county in this State
within which the property subject to such lien is situated."
5. "Such perfection is, of course, a matter of federal law." United States
v. Scovil, 75 S. Ct. 244, 246 (1955).
6. 37 STAT. 1016 (1913).
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until the Collector (now District Director) has recorded the lien
under appropriate State law. The Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina held in the Scovil case that the landlord's lien came within this,
language, without indicating which of the four exceptions above
quoted was applicable. Apparently they considered the landlord a
"purchaser", for the federal cases before Scovil had not clearly de-
fined the meaning of this word.7 The trial court, confirming an able
opinion by E. Inman as Master, held that the landlord was a "pur-
chaser", and also that he prevailed under the "mortgagee" exception,
because his lien under South Carolina law would be superior to that
of a mortgagee.8  Mr. Justice Minton summarily dismissed the ar-
gument that the landlord was a "purchaser", 9 and did not mention
the other argument, which seemed to present the only difficult problem
in the case. The case indicates that nothing short of a judgment
would protect the creditor against the secret lien of the government
in this case.
Two interesting tax cases were decided by the Supreme Court of
South Carolina. Stephens v. Hendricksl o was an action for claim
and delivery to recover possession of an automobile seized by a coun-
ty Delinquent Tax Collector for delinquent state taxes. The car-
was seized while parked on the lot of one Wright, a used car dealer
and the allegedly delinquent taxpayer. Plaintiff claimed ownership
of the car, and alleged that he had left it temporarily with the dealer
under an agreement whereby Wright would act as plaintiff's agent
in attempting to sell it. Respondent tax collector demurred to the
complaint, alleging among other grounds1" that plaintiff's remedy
was limited to Sections 65-1465 through 65-1467,12 which provide
for making payment under protest of any taxes and entering suit
against the South Carolina Tax Commission. The Supreme Court
reversed the Common Pleas Court, Pickens County, which had sus-
tained the demurrer. The opinion of Acting Associate Justice Eat-
7. National Refining Co. v. United States, 160 F. 2d 951 (8th Cir. 1947) de-
fined a purchaser under the act as one who "for a valuable present considera-
tion, acquires property or an interest in property."
8. As Mr. Inman put it, "The mortgage takes precedence over the federal
tax lien until recorded as required by Section 3672; the landlord's lien takes
precedence over the mortgage. It necessarily follows that the landlord's lierb
takes precedence over the federal tax lien." Transcript of Record, United States
V. Scovil, in the Supreme Court of South Carolina, p. 10. This problem is dis-
cussed in Anderson, op. cit. supra note 1, 41 CALIF. L. Rtv. 269 (1953).
9. "A purchaser within the meaning of Section 3672 usually means one who
acquires title for a valuable consideration in the manner of vendor and vendee!
See note 2 supra, at 247.
10. 226 S.C. 79, 83 S.E. 2d 634 (1954).
11. The other questions concerned pleading problems.
12. CoDn OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952.
[Vol. 8;
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mon, concurred in by Justice Taylor, stated that these sections did
not limit the remedies of a citizen who owed no tax, and who asserted
that his property had been illegally seized for the taxes of a third
person. Justices Stukes, Oxner and Legge concurred in the result
without stating any misgivings they might have with the opinion,
which presumably were not addressed to this part of the opinion.
The case was sent back to the circuit court to litigate the defense
of the Collector under Title 57, Section 308, 1952 Code.13
Asmer v. Livingston14 held that a retail liquor dealer was not en-
titled, under Section 65-1268, 1952 Code, to a refund for the amount
of State liquor tax stamps affixed to alcoholic beverages in his place
of business which were destroyed or rendered unfit for sale as the
result of a fire. The statutory provision that stamps were to be sold
only to holders of a valid wholesaler's license was held to limit the
word "licensees" in Section 65-1268 to such wholesalers. Mr. Jus-
tice Oxner for the court pointed out that under the statutory licens-
ing scheme the duty of paying the stamp tax was on the wholesaler,
that the statutory language clearly indicated that refund in case of
damaged stamps was limited to the wholesaler, and that any risk of
loss to a retailer or consumer could be covered by insurance. The
court was influenced also by the fact that the administrative body
charged with enforcing the tax stamp laws had consistently construed
the statute to permit refunds only to wholesalers.
A few tax questions arose in other litigation. Bush v. Aiken
Electric Co-op, Inc.15 held that merely because the co-operative had
received certain tax exemptions, it was not thereby made a charitable
corporation for other purposes (claimed immunity from tort liability).
Gregg v. Moore16 held, as repeatedly has been held in South Caro-
lina, that a tax sale was invalid where the property was not sold in
the name of the true owner. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v.
Riddick17 held that particular extensions or additions to manufactur-
ing plants were exempt from a county tax for servicing county bonds,
where the South Carolina statute18 granted "exemption from county
taxes (but not from school taxes or public service district taxes)" on
certain conditions that the taxpayer had met. St. Paul-Mercury In-
demnity Co. v. Donaldson'9 held that a surety who had been forced
13. Providing for the recording of any reservations in personal property
given by bailor to bailee.
14. 225 S.C. 341, 82 S.E. 2d 465 (1954).
15. 85 S.E. 2d 716 (S.C. 1955).
16. 85 S.E. 2d 279 (S.C. 1954).
17. 225 S.C. 283, 82 S.E. 2d 189 (1954).
18. Act June 18, 1949, § 2, 46 ST. AT LARGt 593.
19. 225 S.C. 476, 83 S.E. 2d 159 (1954), discussed in this Survey under
Suretyship.
19551
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to pay California Sales and Use taxes of his principal on a surety
bond given the state was subrogated to the rights of the state in re-
spect of the claim for taxes. The tax claim was held to be a debt
that could be assigned to an individual by contract or through the
equitable doctrine of subrogation.
As usual, the legislature made many technical changes in the tax
laws. These have been adequately discussed in the Summer issue
of the South Carolina Law Quarterly.
2 0
20. See T. R. Sams, Recent Legislation, 7 S.C.L.Q. 620, 623-625 (Summer
1955).
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